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Abstract 
This paper examines the fiscal impact of privatization revenues in 47 developing 
countries. There are many reasons that privatization is attractive for the central 
government of developing countries. If substantial, these revenues from the sale of state 
owned enterprises can present a potential solution to persistent deficits. On the other 
hand, the privatization revenues could be used to finance an even larger deficit. In this 
paper, I will discuss previous research on the fiscal impact of privatization revenues, the 
factors that contribute to persistent fiscal budget deficits and explain how empirical 
research on the fiscal impact of privatization in the developing world is a logical 
extension of this research. Using data from the World Bank’s Privatization Database on 
privatization revenues from the years 1988 to 2008 and panel data techniques, I find that 
an increase in privatization revenues is correlated with a worsening of the fiscal budget 
balance, lending support to the hypothesis that revenues from the sales of state owned 
enterprises are used to finance a larger deficit.  
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Introduction 
 Privatization of state owned enterprises has long been promoted in the developing 
world due to the belief that it brings about improved efficiency in these firms and 
stimulates macroeconomic growth (Young, 1998; Davis et al, 2000; Katsoulakos, 
Likoyanni, 2002). The privatization of state owned enterprises has been most noticeable 
in post-communist countries and in Latin America as many of these countries 
implemented large privatization programs starting in the early 1990s. Table 3 of 
Appendix 1 provides a graphical representation of privatization revenues accruing to the 
fiscal budget worldwide. Many academics believe privatization should be undertaken for 
the sole intent of improving firm efficiency (Mackenzie, 1998, Kikeri, Nellis, Shirley; 
1992). However, as countries began to privatize, some governments made it explicitly 
clear that the goal of their privatization program was to improve their fiscal deficit. 
(Pinheiro, Schneider, 1994; Przeworski, 1991).  
Due in part to the worldwide oil crisis of the 1970s, many countries accumulated 
large central government debt in the subsequent years. Most at the time assumed the debt 
would go away with more prosperous times, but the deficits persisted. Also contributing 
to these deficits were the inefficient state owned enterprises. During the late 1970s, state 
operated enterprises generated deficits of four percent on average (Pinheiro, Schneider, 
1994). In many ways, the decision to privatize was determined by fiscal necessity, rather 
than the desire for improved efficiency (Przeworski, 1991). The lump sum revenues from 
the sale of state owned enterprises can be seen as a potential solution to these persistent 
deficits. Simply removing the inefficient firm from its books should also improve a 
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government’s fiscal situation as subsidies and other transfers sent to keep the firm alive 
should decline (Young 1998, Davis et al, 2000).  
The purpose of this paper is to determine the contemporaneous impact of 
privatization revenues on the fiscal budget balance in developing countries. Of the 
revenues that accrue to the budget, governments have the option of either saving or 
spending the receipts. For a government facing liquidity constraints, the privatization 
revenues could be used to finance an even larger deficit (Barnett, 2000; Davis et al., 
2000). However, the decision to increase spending using privatization revenues as 
financing should be made cautiously as privatization revenues are temporary, and 
spending might become entrenched at levels higher than the revenue raising capability of 
the government (Davis et al., 2000).  
Given their uncertain nature, privatization revenues can also be saved until a 
subsequent budget can allocate the funds (Barnett, 2000; Young 1998, Davis et al., 2000). 
The “earmarking” of privatization revenues for specific uses in the future can help avoid 
permanent increases in spending, but can also make fiscal management more difficult if a 
government’s long term priorities change (Davis et al., 2000). A central government can 
use the revenues to reduce their public debt, thereby permanently lowering the deficit. 
The decision to reduce public debt could signal a government’s commitment to a 
macroeconomic stabilization policy, thereby contributing to increased market confidence 
and eventually leading to a reduction of interest payments (Davis et al., 2000).  The 
reduction of interest payments further improves the fiscal budget balance.  
In this paper I will empirically examine how the fiscal budget balance in a sample 
of 47 developing countries is impacted by privatization revenues. This paper will 
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examine whether privatization revenues are associated with an improvement in the fiscal 
budget balance thanks to the retirement of the external public debt and lower interest 
payments, or if the funds are used to finance an even larger deficit. 
Survey of Literature 
The majority of economic literature concerning privatization emphasizes 
microeconomic aspects of the privatization process, particularly the subsequent efficiency 
gains (Megginson, Netter 2001; Pinto, Belka, Krajewski 1993, LaPorta, Lopez de 
Silanes, Shleifer 2000). There is significantly less literature devoted to the 
macroeconomic impact of privatization, and even less of it is empirical. The studies that 
do focus on the macroeconomic impact of privatization tend to ignore developing 
countries, and instead hone in on high-income countries. I plan on filling this gap in the 
literature and empirically testing the impact of privatization on a government’s finances 
in the developing world. 
Several papers discuss the impact of privatization on a government’s budget 
balance. The consensus of this literature is that state owned enterprises tend to be 
inefficient due to the “soft” nature of their budget constraint (Young, 1998; Pinheiro, 
Schneider, 2004). State owned enterprises tend to be overstaffed and pay excessive wages 
(Davis et al, 2000). They require subsidies to stay operational, and act as a drain on the 
government treasury and the entire economy. Simply removing the inefficient firm from 
its books ought to improve the fiscal situation of the government (Young, 1998; Pinheiro, 
Schneider, 2004). The decision to privatize can be due in part to a fiscal crisis and the 
lump sum revenues from the sale of the state operated enterprise can be seen as a 
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potential solution to the problem (Pinheiro, Schneider, 2004; Mansoor 1987, Przeworski 
1991). For countries with liquidity constraints, the lump sum proceeds from the sale of 
inefficient state owned enterprises could allow the government to finance a larger deficit.  
Given the option to save or spend the privatization receipts, some of the literature 
finds that the governments tend to save and not spend the revenues (Davis et al, 2000; 
Barnett, 2000). Additionally, privatization significantly improves the fiscal situation as 
subsidies and other grants significantly decrease when compared to the pre-privatization 
period (Davis et al, 2000; Katsoulakos, Likoyanni 2002). However, some of the literature 
concludes that privatization has had little fiscal impact. The revenues from privatization 
were too little and too late to provide a solution to many fiscal crises (Pinheiro, 
Schneider, 1994; Hachette, Luders 1993, Mackenzie, 1998). 
 The fiscal budget balance can improve from the privatization process in ways 
other than from direct proceeds. There is evidence that the privatization of inefficient 
state owned enterprises can lead to an improved macroeconomic atmosphere. High 
growth rates of GDP are linked to a higher share of GDP produced by the private sector 
(Barnett 2000, Davis et al., 2000). Privatization is also associated with a decrease in 
unemployment, despite the fact that many claim that state owned enterprises with a “soft” 
budget are likely to be overstaffed and privatization will lead to many losing their jobs 
(Davis et al, 2000). There is also evidence that firms pay higher taxes after the 
privatization period (Katsoulakos, Likoyanni 2002, Davis et al 2000). All this evidence 
has led to the conclusion that the real fiscal gain of privatization is not seen right away in 
the form of direct revenues, but rather in the improved long run macroeconomic 
performance (Pinheiro, Schneider, 1994). 
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 In order to isolate the impact of privatization revenues on the fiscal budget 
balance, it is important to understand the other factors that lead to persistent deficits. A 
large set of literature is dedicated to explaining the presence of persistent deficits in many 
countries worldwide. Before the 1970s oil crisis, most academics thought budget deficits 
were due to tough economic times. Since governments want to maintain a constant tax 
rate, prosperous times would result in a budget surplus while war and economically 
difficult times would result in a deficit (Barro, 1979). Additionally, richer countries tend 
to be have an older population and thus tend to spend more on social security (Shelton, 
2007).  However, macroeconomic performance and demographics alone do not explain 
the persistence of government deficits well after the oil crisis of the 1970s (Alesina, 
Perotti, 1995).  
 More recent literature is dedicated to explaining why persistent deficits are 
observed in peace time and why certain countries have large deficits while others do not. 
The literature that attempts to answer these questions can be broken down into three 
separate categories: one that emphasizes politically oriented variables to explain 
persistent budget deficits, another that examines the role of political business cycles, and 
a final set which looks at the effect of institutional changes such as the creation of the 
European Union.  
 A large number of papers attempt to find an explanation for budget deficits in the 
political structure of a country. Larger deficits tend to be seen in “weaker” government, 
where weakness is defined by a short average tenure of government and the presence of 
many political parties. Budgetary management problems can occur when many parties 
are battling for political control. When there is conflict between parties, it is more 
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difficult for the government to enact budget reduction policies (Roubini, Sachs, 1989; 
Alesina, Tabellini, 1990). Large levels of public debt are positively correlated with 
unstable and polarized political systems (Alesina, Tabellini,1990).  
Not all scholars are in agreement that polarized political systems with many 
parties lead to large deficits. Instead, a budgeting procedure that commits the government 
to exercising fiscal discipline is a more significant factor (Volkerink, de Haan, 2001; Von 
Hagen 1992). A process that gives the prime minister a position superior to spending 
ministers, limits amendment power of parliament, and does not allow for many changes 
to the budget is favorable for fiscal discipline (Von Hagen, 1992; Volkerink, de Haan, 
2001). 
 Also within the politico-institutional explanations of budget deficits are the set of 
papers that try to find an answer for the persistence of budget deficits within the 
government’s ideology. There is some support for the theory that right-wing governments 
tend to be more fiscally responsible than left-wing governments, at least during the 1970s 
(Volkerink, de Haan, 2001; Mulas-Granados, 2003). However, this conclusion does not 
appear to be the consensus of the literature. Others have found that left-wing 
governments do not have higher deficits (Alesina, Roubini, 2001; Bayar, Smeets, 2009). 
Some point to the late 1990s as evidence that left leaning governments can be fiscally 
responsible as many leftist governments reoriented their policies and successfully 
reduced their budgets (Mulas-Granados, 2003).  
 Distinct from the political determinants of budget deficits, some literature 
attempts to find an explanation for budget deficits in the behavior of policy-makers. 
These models introduce a sort of political business cycle which hypothesizes that 
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spending will increase before and during election years. This is due to the hypothesis that 
the services provided by increased spending will gain the politician popularity and 
maximize his or her probability of winning the election. The hypothesis that policy 
makers behave opportunistically is confirmed by the literature (Bayar, Smeets, 2009; 
Mink, de Haan 2005). 
 Separate from the political and behavioral approaches to explain deficits are the 
models that attempt to capture the effect of institutional changes. The introduction of 
strict rules and guidelines put in place by the Maastricht Treaty, which requires members 
of the European Union to have certain debt to GDP ratios, has allowed many European 
countries to escape from the large amounts of debt they had accumulated years before. 
The budgetary situations of most European countries improved after the introduction of 
the Maastricht Treaty, but a lot is still unknown about the European integration process 
(Bayar, Smeets, 2009). 
 Now that more is known about what contributes to budget deficits, I will attempt 
to isolate the impact that privatization revenues have on the fiscal budget balance. 
Expanding upon this literature, I will test whether or not privatization revenues in the 
developing world significantly improve the finances of a government.  
Data 
Data on privatization proceeds from the sales of state owned enterprises comes 
from the World Bank Privatization Database. It contains data on the sale price of 
privatization transactions in developing countries of at least one million dollars between 
the years 1988 to 2008. The database only includes transactions that generate revenue or 
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monetary receipts for the government and excludes transactions in high income countries. 
The sales are recorded in U.S. dollar amounts at the time of the sale, or were converted 
from local currencies into U.S. dollars at the average annual exchange rate. To adjust for 
inflation, I have since converted the revenue into U.S. dollars using the year 2000 as the 
base year. This was done using the Consumer Price Index as calculated by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. I then converted these values into a percentage of GDP using 
data on GDP (in year 2000 U.S. dollars) from the World Development Indicators.  
The privatization revenue data used by the World Bank Privatization Database 
comes from various sources: The World Bank Privatization Database uses OECD data on 
privatization in Africa, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development data on 
privatization in Europe and Central Asia, the Privatization Barometer for other select 
European countries, Latin Finance and Privatization International, the Private 
Participation in Infrastructure database, various government web sites and the World 
Bank’s own internal database. The use of so many sources increases the probability of 
data discrepancies arising. Also, there are various definitions of proceeds, but the 
database notes that in most cases gross revenues and not net revenues are used. Gross 
revenues are likely to be higher as they do not account for all the costs of privatization, 
such as the compensation of dismissed workers. Additionally, different databases may 
have calculated the proceeds in different ways. Some may have used market value while 
others may have used face value.  
The data available on the sale price of the transactions is based upon the 
announcement date of the sale as opposed to the actual receipt of funds. In many cases, 
the receipt of funds takes place over several years. This caveat complicates analysis of 
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the data quite a bit, and will therefore be ignored. For simplicity, I will assume that all 
funds accrue to the budget upon the announcement of the sale.  
There are other shortcomings of the World Bank Privatization Database. The 
database does not include the type of privatization method or the nationality of the buyer. 
If the buyer is foreign, and the purchase large, the capital inflow can lead to the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate under a floating exchange rate regime. Under a 
fixed exchange rate regime, this capital inflow may lead to an expansion of the money 
base through increase in foreign exchange reserves, causing inflationary pressure. This 
could lead to the macroeconomic policy response of fiscal tightening to contain inflation 
and prevent the appreciation of the real exchange rate (Davis et al, 2000). The database 
does not allow us to control for the impact that a foreign purchase might have on the 
budget.  
The World Bank admits that the database is not exhaustive. Some transactions 
may have been missed and there are slight inconsistencies in the data. However, it is the 
best estimation of privatization activity available.  
Data on central government budget balance comes from the World Development 
Indicators and Global Development Finance databases of the World Bank. If a 
government is running a budget deficit, this variable will take on a negative value. 
Conversely, if there is a budget surplus, the variable will take on a positive value. It is 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. This variable is defined as revenue (including grants) 
minus expense, minus net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. There are large gaps in the 
data as the entirety of the sample is comprised of developing countries. Not only is there 
generally less data from developing countries, it also tends to be of poorer quality 
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(Shelton, 2007). This limits the sample to countries that not only have data on 
privatization revenues, but also on a central government’s deficit.  
Macroeconomic variables such as population growth, inflation and unemployment 
also come from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. All are 
expressed as a percentage. There are no gaps in the population data, and very few in the 
inflation data. Unfortunately, there are quite a few missing values in the unemployment 
data. Again, the data for the poorest countries in the sample is likely to be of poorer 
quality than the data available for wealthier countries.  
The World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions provides me with control 
variables on a government’s fragmentation, whether or not the executive branch has a 
majority in the legislative branch, and whether or not a certain year was an election year.  
The variable to measure the fragmentation of the government measures the probability 
that two deputies picked at random from the parliament will be of different political 
parties. This variable takes a value from zero to one, with the value of zero meaning the 
parliament is completely occupied by one party. The variable for executive control of the 
legislative branch takes the value of 1 if the executive branch has a majority in the 
legislative branch and a 0 if it does not. Although there is some evidence that the 
ideology of the government has an impact on its budget balance, there are so many 
missing values in the dataset that including it would significantly limit the size of my 
sample, and has therefore been omitted from my regression analysis. 
To control for wartime spending that could affect the budget balance, I have 
included a binary variable that indicates whether or not a country was directly involved in 
a war or any other form or organized violence for the years 1988 to 2008. This data 
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comes from the Center for Systemic Peace and their Major Episodes of Political Violence 
and Conflict Regions database. This data does not include countries that engage in 
military intervention that takes place solely in other countries as they database claims 
they are not directly affected by the violence. Therefore, this data might not accurately 
represent the scope of military expenditures by a government. 
The sample includes 47 countries, all of which are listed in Table 4 of the 
Appendix. On average, countries in the sample ran a deficit of 2.04 percent of GDP, 
consistent with the notion that central governments built up significant levels of debt 
following the oil crisis of the 1970s (Bayar, Smeets, 2009).  
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fiscal Budget 
Balance(% of GDP) 367 -2.04 3.93 -18.40 40.43 
Privatization Revenues 
(% of GDP) 367 0.74 1.62 0.00 11.95 
GDP Growth (%) 367 4.40 4.69 -29.00 18.29 
Unemployment Rate 
(%) 367 9.59 6.55 0.87 37.58 
Inflation Rate (%) 367 19.64 126.95 -5.78 1945.11 
Population Growth (%) 367 1.16 1.24 -3.82 4.58 
% of population >65 367 7.58 4.62 1.98 17.19 
Election 367 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Executive Control 367 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Government 
Fragmentation 367 0.24 0.27 0.00 0.89 
War 367 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00 
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Econometric Method 
Using this data, I regress the central government’s budget balance on privatization 
revenues and a numerous other explanatory variables in a cross country panel. The basic 
specification is:  
Yit =α + β1PRit+ β2Macroit+ β3Institutionsit +uit  
where i indexes the country and t indexes the year. PR is the variable for privatization 
revenues. I have included certain macroeconomic control variables as the budget is 
affected by macroeconomic performance (Barro, 1979). The macroeconomic variables 
are: GDP growth, unemployment rate, inflation rate, population growth, and the fraction 
of population over 65. Additionally, literature suggests that the structure of institutions 
can have an impact on the budget balance. It is known that spending tends to increase 
during an election year (Bayar, Smeets, 2009). Because of this I have included an 
election year dummy variable that indicates whether or not a certain year was an election 
year. Fragmented governments with many parties tend to have persistent deficits 
(Roubini, Sachs, 1989; Alesina, Tabellini, 1990). For this reason, I have included a 
measure of government fragmentation in my regression. Also included is a variable that 
indicates whether or not the executive branch has a majority in the law making branch. If 
the executive branch has a majority in the law making branch there will be fewer checks 
upon the law making branch’s power, thereby not committing it to fiscal discipline (Von 
Hagen, 1992; Volkerink, de Haan, 2001). I have also included a binary variable that 
indicates whether or not a country is involved in a war or some other sort of conflict. A 
war could raise government spending significantly and thus have a negative impact on 
the budget balance (Barro, 1979).  
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The first regression I will run is a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), random 
effects regression. The second is a pooled OLS regression with random effects and robust 
standard errors to control for potential heteroskedasticity in the error term. The third is a  
random effects panel regression, and the fourth is a fixed effects panel regression. The 
last regression is a fixed effects model that only controls for macroeconomic trends, and 
disregards any potential institutional impact. I suspect that the fixed effects panel 
regression is the most appropriate to use in this situation as there are likely to be omitted 
variables that are country specific and their effects are unobserved in a random effects 
model. The fixed effects model creates n different intercepts, one for each country where 
the intercept captures these unobserved variables that vary from country to country but do 
not change over time.  
The specification under the fixed effects model becomes: 
 Yit =αi + β1PRit+ β2Macroit+ β3Institutionsit +uit  
where αi is the country specific intercept. This intercept can be thought of as the effect of 
being in a certain country i. The slope coefficients, β, are the same for all countries 
(Stock, Watson, 2006). I will discuss the appropriateness of the fixed effects in more 
detail later.  
Results 
Using a pooled OLS regression, I find that privatization revenues do not 
significantly impact the budget balance. Under this model, the variables that significantly 
affect the budget balance are GDP growth, unemployment, and the war time indicator. 
Complete regression results are reported in Table 2. The results in column one show that 
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a ten percent increase in GDP growth is associated with a .82 percent improvement in the 
budget balance. This appears to be consistent with the hypothesis of Barro(1979) that 
prosperous economic times will help improve the fiscal situation of a government. 
Similarly, a ten percent increase in the unemployment rate, an indicator of rough 
economic times, worsens the budget by .961 percent. The involvement of a country in 
war appears to worsen the budget by roughly 2.2 percent.  
Although the values of the other coefficients are not statistically significant from 
zero, it is still important to note the sign in front of these coefficients. The coefficient in 
front of the population growth variable and the percentage of population above 65 years 
old variable are both negative. This lends some support to the hypothesis that larger and 
older populations lead to increased government spending, particularly due to increased 
social security expenditures (Shelton, 2007). The positive coefficient in front of the 
government fragmentation variable seems to suggest that increased fragmentation leads 
to an improvement in the budget balance which is contrary to what most academic 
literature concludes. Column 2 reports the results of a pooled OLS regression that uses a 
robust standard error. Under this model, the inflation rate and percentage of the 
population above 65 years old are now significant factors in explaining the fiscal budget 
balance.  
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Table 2 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Pooled 
OLS, robust 
(3) 
Panel, re 
(4) 
Panel, fe 
(5) 
Panel, fe 
VARIABLES Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit Deficit 
      
Privatization Revenues -0.0428 -0.0428 -0.148 -0.177* -0.163 
 (0.127) (0.120) (0.0988) (0.100) (0.0998) 
GDP Growth 0.0793* 0.0793** -0.00117 -0.0129 -0.0105 
 (0.0434) (0.0329) (0.0346) (0.0352) (0.0346) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0965*** -0.0965** -0.0583 -0.0280 -0.0179 
 (0.0313) (0.0441) (0.0512) (0.0618) (0.0614) 
Inflation Rate 0.00135 0.00135** -0.000570 -0.000557 -8.80e-05 
 (0.00164) (0.000577) (0.00125) (0.00134) (0.00132) 
Population Growth -0.152 -0.152 -0.178 -0.384 -0.400 
 (0.322) (0.437) (0.331) (0.365) (0.362) 
 % of Population >65 -0.151 -0.151** -0.0878 -0.00464 -0.0187 
 (0.0935) (0.0697) (0.135) (0.289) (0.278) 
Election -0.0470 -0.0470 0.0233 0.0462  
 (0.497) (0.415) (0.358) (0.356)  
Executive Control 0.135 0.135 -0.112 0.0561  
 (0.476) (0.443) (0.554) (0.594)  
Government 
Fragmentation 
0.856 0.856 -1.164 -1.493*  
 (0.858) (0.945) (0.779) (0.802)  
War -2.217*** -2.217*** -0.00190 0.427  
 (0.487) (0.598) (0.516) (0.545)  
Constant 0.255 0.255 0.246 -0.897 -1.100 
 (1.213) (1.062) (1.578) (2.461) (2.291) 
      
Observations 367 367 367 367 367 
R-squared 0.081 0.081  0.026 0.013 
Number of Countries   47 47 47 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, a pooled OLS regression is not the ideal model to use when dealing 
with panel data. Serial correlation is particularly likely to arise in panel data. Serial 
correlation means that the error term, uit, is correlated with itself across observations. It is 
particularly likely to occur if the omitted variables are country specific and persistent 
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(Stock, Watson, 2006). While I would like to think my model captures a lot of what 
makes a country unique, there are obviously omitted variables that could have been 
included that also contribute to the explanation of the budget balance. It is important to 
note that serial correlation does not create a bias in the OLS estimators, but it does violate 
a key assumption of the OLS model that all explanatory variables are independently and 
identically distributed. This results in incorrect standard errors that do not produce 
confidence intervals with the desired confidence level (Stock, Watson, 2006). 
The results in column 3 are those of a random effects panel regression. Keeping in 
mind that the model likely suffers from omitted variable bias, we should not draw many 
conclusions from the result of this particular regression. None of the variables in this 
model provide a significant explanation for changes in the fiscal budget balance. If these 
omitted variables remain constant over time in a given country, then we can use a fixed 
effects model to capture their effect.  
In the fixed effects model, privatization revenues have a significant and negative 
relationship with the budget balance. A look at column 4 of Table 2 shows that a ten 
percent increase in privatization revenues is associated with a 1.79 percent worsening of 
the central government’s budget balance. This value is significant at the ten percent level. 
The other variable that significantly impacts the budget balance is the fragmentation of 
the government. Increasing the probability that two deputies picked at random will be of 
different parties by ten percent will result in a .15 percent worsening of the budget 
balance. This result seems to confirm the hypothesis that the presence of many political 
parties battling for political control will lead will lead to budget management problems 
(Roubini, Sachs, 1989; Alesina, Tabellini, 1990). The model is unable to confirm the 
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hypothesis that the budget balance is affected significantly by the performance of the 
macroeconomy. GDP growth, inflation rate and unemployment rate do not have a 
significant impact on the budget.  
The fixed effects model is an attempt to deal with omitted variables that vary 
across countries but remain constant over time. However, it might be an improper 
assumption in this case to suppose that these omitted variables remain constant over time. 
The privatization process itself is associated with vast reforms in economic and 
institutional structuring. Many countries have to create new institutional framework to 
allow privatization programs to flourish. These changes include, amongst others: the 
introduction and enforcement of modern corporate law, shareholder rights, free market 
policies, liberalization of trade policy, and establishment of a legal code ensuring private 
property rights (McFaul, 1995; Young, 1998). The establishment of a proper institutional 
framework before the implementation improves the privatization program’s probability 
of success. However, many countries did not make these reforms until the privatization 
process was already underway (Young, 1998, McFaul 1995). For many Eastern European 
countries and former Soviet Republics, these institutions were created from scratch and 
accompanied a large scale privatization effort. Although it is not included in the sample, 
the case of Russia is an appropriate example. Property rights and corporate governance in 
Russia were initially unresolved and led to a less successful result than seen in the 
privatization process of the Czech Republic where these institutions were constructed at 
the start of the program (Young, 1998).  
The fixed effects assumption that the omitted variables that make a country 
unique are fixed over time is perhaps an incorrect supposition as many countries 
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implement institutional changes during the privatization process and the structure of the 
economy may also drastically changes as well. This is confirmed as all individual error 
terms, ui, fail an F test, meaning that the error term is significantly different from 0. That 
being said, the model does still show that privatization revenues are associated with a 
worsening of the fiscal budget balance.  
Only controlling for the macroeconomic variables of GDP growth, inflation rate, 
unemployment rate, and percentage of population older than 65, results in privatization 
revenues no longer being a significant predictor of the budget balance. In fact, none of 
the variables are significant. Column 5 reports the results of this regression. Although 
none of the variables significantly explain the fiscal budget balance, it is important to 
note that privatization revenues are incredibly close to being significant at the ten percent 
significance level. Once again, the fixed effects assumption might not be correct here as 
the individual error terms, ui, are significantly different from zero.  
Conclusion 
  Contrary to what some of the previous research found, an increase in the amount 
of privatization revenues is actually associated with a worsening of the contemporaneous 
fiscal budget balance. This conclusion needs to be qualified as there are many gaps in the 
data for the fiscal budget balance, and data for developing countries tends to be of poorer 
quality than the data available for high income countries (Shelton, 2007). Also, the 
assumption of the fixed effects model that the omitted variables captured by the “fixed 
effects” are time invariant might not be correct as the privatization process is associated 
with changes in institutional and economic structure, many of which occur during the 
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middle of the process (Young, 1998; McFaul; 1995). Government fragmentation is the 
other variable that significantly explains the budget balance. An increase in the level of 
fragmentation correlates with a worsening of the fiscal budget balance.  
 Although many governments in developing countries express their desire to 
improve their fiscal budget balance as justification for privatizing inefficient state owned 
enterprises, the privatization proceeds from the sale of these companies do not seem to 
have a positive impact on the fiscal budget in the short run. Revenues from the sale of 
state operated enterprises are often spent instead of being saved.  
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Appendix   
 
Table 3 
 
Source: World Bank Privatization Database   
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Sample Countries 
Table 4 
 
Country Frequency Country Frequency 
Argentina 3 Mexico 10 
Belarus 7 Moldova 4 
Bulgaria 2 Namibia 11 
Burundi 1 Niger 2 
Cameroon 5 Pakistan 15 
Chile 8 Panama 12 
Croatia 16 Peru 17 
Czech Republic 15 Philippines 7 
Egypt 15 Poland 8 
El Salvador 7 Romania 1 
Estonia 2 Senegal 3 
Ghana 5 Slovakia 6 
Guatemala 15 South Africa 9 
Hungary 6 Sri Lanka 18 
India 14 Thailand 5 
Indonesia 4 Trinidad and Tobago 7 
Jamaica 6 Turkey 3 
Kenya 11 Uganda 10 
Latvia 15 Ukraine 10 
Lebanon 9 Uruguay 7 
Lithuania 8 Venezuela 6 
Macedonia 4 Yemen 3 
Malaysia 5 
  
  
Total 367 
